NRI Annual Review 2026 - Flipbook - Page 34
Furthermore, Jeremy Edwards, Head
of Nuclear Security Strategy at the UK
National Nuclear Laboratory, noted that
the industry was seeing a paradigm shift
toward “Secure-by-Design” principles. This
philosophy requires that robust information,
computer, and physical security measures
be seamlessly engineered into the asset
from inception, rather than retrofitted.
Managing novel nuclear applications
demand innovative security metrics,
focusing on quantifying real-time security
performance via advanced modelling and
simulation tools to build high-fidelity digital
twins of facilities.
Part III: Maritime deployment
and geopolitical realities
Maritime applications of nuclear
technology—encompassing nuclear
vessel propulsion and floating offshore
power generation—certainly represents
a significant growth vector but faces
regulatory uncertainty due to fragmented
international governance. Mark Tipping,
Global Offshore Power to X Director
at Lloyd’s Register, explained that
the integration of nuclear reactors
into maritime assets introduces an
unprecedented layer of administrative
complexity by bringing sovereign nuclear
regulators directly into the marine
environment. Current global frameworks
exhibit significant statutory gaps regarding
marine licensing, liability channelling, openocean safety, maritime security, and hull
classification. On the international stage,
the IAEA and the IMO are actively working
to overhaul legacy frameworks, with
multi-lateral efforts targeting completion
around 2030.
These long-term regulatory developments
all take place against a highly volatile
geopolitical backdrop. Roman Dudkin,
Operational Engineer at Khmelnitsky
NPP and former Operations Engineer
at Zaporizhzhia NPP for Energoatom
Ukraine, emphasized that the operational
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paradigm for civil nuclear energy changed
fundamentally in 2022, forcing utilities to
maintain reactor safety in the middle of a
conventional, full-scale war. The precedent
set in Ukraine – characterized by the kinetic
attack, seizure, and militarisation of the
Zaporizhzhia station, alongside deliberate
missile strikes targeting the high-voltage
substations powering the nuclear fleet
– signalled a breakdown of historical
deterrent barriers.
Concurrently, Tom Holmes, Senior
Underwriter - War & Terrorism at Liberty
Global Group, detailed that the threat of
state-sponsored industrial sabotage has
intensified dramatically, tied to covert
grey-zone hybrid activities across Europe. In
contrast, the baseline threat of ideological
terrorism targeting nuclear facilities
remained statistically low.
Part IV: Risk transfer, capital
insurance, and commercial
fusion scaling
The nuclear sector is evolving from a
highly predictable, slow-moving model
dominated by government-led projects into
a diverse commercial ecosystem featuring
non-traditional stakeholders such as tech
hyperscalers, industrial manufacturers, and
private equity firms. Kate Fowler, Global
Head of Nuclear (US) at wtw, explained
that traditional nuclear risk transfer and
insurance frameworks are under severe
strain as a result. The vast majority of
these emergent projects represented
FOAK deployments characterized by
limited operating histories, immature
supply chains, and unproven advanced
fuels that introduce extreme underwriting
uncertainty.
Constructing a robust risk transfer
framework requires the early engagement
of specialized nuclear insurers, allowing
expertise in asset loss drivers and structural
resilience to be incorporated directly into
core reactor design, procurement strategies,
